1 Introduction make it possible to apply an institutional rule lending more bargaining power to a minority position, and, secondly, the inclusion of an actor with a strong stake in general-interest issues;
namely, the European Parliament. Both strategies may be combined.
This essay raises the questions: why and to what extent does a conflict exist between economic liberalisation and general-interest goals in the first place? I will then turn to the role of European policy-making, which aims at striking a balance between the poles of market integration and competition, on the one hand, and the provision of public services, on the other. What are the existing European policies and how do they fare when measured against these two goals? I then focus on the central question of the analysis: how can the pro-generalinterest decisions at the cross-sectoral and sectoral level (in energy, telecommunications and rail) be accounted for in terms of the interaction of the formal political and legal actors involved in shaping the outcomes at the European level?
The economics of regulation: are liberalisation and general-interest services conflicting goals?
Before liberalisation, network industries were shielded from competition because -from an economic perspective -they were considered to be natural monopolies in which one provider could offer services cheaper than several because of a specific cost structure such as the high start-up investment for service provision required to join the technical network infrastructure and economies of scale. From a political perspective the services provided on the basis of a natural monopoly are considered to be politically and socially desirable, and the access of all customers should be guaranteed. Therefore they should be organised as public monopolies or publicly-licensed private monopolies (Baumol, Panzar and Willig 1988) . Liberalisation challenged the economic view that network utilities are natural monopolies, and it introduced the notion of "contestable markets", arguing that while -in view of sinking costs and economies of scale -the network infrastructure should have one owner, the operation of services on the network could be opened up to competition in order to increase the efficiency of service provision (Engel and Knieps 1998) . With the abolition of public monopolies and the liberalisation of service operations, the number of firms operating would increase and the 1 I hence focus on the functional dimension of regulation (concerned with the scope and goals of regulation) as shaped during policy formulation, and not on the organizational dimension of the design and architecture of regulatory institutions. For the de facto effects of liberalization on the performance of network industries in rail transport and telecommunications measured against general-interest goals, see Héritier 1998; Héritier and Schmidt 2000. ensuing competition would lead to greater productivity, thereby widening consumer choice and lowering prices. In this way liberalisation would promote the general-interest goals of accessibility, equality and affordability. However, this would not occur if market failure led to only one or more firms acquiring market dominance and thus being able to fix prices too high, thereby working against the interests in a universal and affordable service (Bergman et al. 1998:116) .
2
A customer for whom the access charge (which need not be above cost) is too high, does not have access to services. This may be the case for customers living in remote areas with low population density where there are no economies of scale. Network industries, however, are politically obliged to provide goods with "merit good" characteristics. In other words, it is a political decision that certain goods, such as access to domestic water, electricity and voice telephony services, must be provided regardless of whether this runs counter to the service operator's efficient pricing policy. Therefore, from the perspective of the political decision-maker committed to citizens'/voters' general-interest goals, political marketcorrecting regulation is needed in order to offset the unwelcome effects of market processes;
setting a price limit on the provision of a specific infrastructure service provides one typical example of such regulation.
Hence, it can generally be argued that liberalisation can facilitate the realisation of servicepublic goals in specific circumstances by the price cuts and the corresponding wider accessibility resulting from competition. At the same time, however, it gives rise to a two-fold need for re-regulation: firstly, in order to make markets work and to prevent market dominance from becoming concentrated in the hands of a few actors, and, secondly, to correct the outcome of market processes so that social and political goals may be met. How do European policies seek to strike a balance between the two goals of market liberalisation, on the one hand, and market-correction to promote general-interest services in the utilities, on the other? 2
Another consequence which interferes with the principle of universal service may arise where there are positive network externalities. If a person cannot join a network because of a relatively high access price (which need not be above cost), the other network members are denied positive network externalities (Bergman et al. 1998:117) .
European legislation which promotes general-interest services
Since the 1980s Community policy has been dominated by the goals of liberalisation. In recent years, however, there has been an increasing emphasis on policies which emphasize goals of social cohesion. The call for maintaining universal service reflects this new orientation (Scott 1995 (ex 90.2) and specified that any assessment of restrictions on competition must take into account the economic conditions in which the company finds itself and the environmentalprotection regulations to which it is subject. In another decision in 1997, on the matter of financing France Poste, the ECJ incorporated the concept of general economic interests into the ruling. It stated that public services provided by the post office must include the collection, transport and distribution of mail for all users of the territory of a member state at uniform tariffs and similar qualitative conditions, irrespective of the particular situation and the profitability of each individual operation. The fiscal advantages granted to public-service enterprises are not considered to be illegal state aid if they do not go beyond the constraints resulting from the particular public-service mission.
The Commission Communication of 1996 also reflects the increasing importance attached to general-interest services 3 . Here, for the first time, the Commission explicitly recognises their importance and presents them as key elements in the European model of society. "Solidarity 3
The Commission defines services of general interest as "market and non-market services which the public authorities class as being of general interest and subject to specific public service obligations". Services of general economic interest as used in Art. 86.3 (formerly 90.3) of the Treaty are defined somewhat more narrowly as "market services which the member states subject to specific public service obligations, such as transport networks, energy and communications". "Universal services", a concept developed in Community bodies, are "a set of general interest requirements which should be satisfied by operators of telecommunications and postal services, for example, throughout the Community. The object of the resulting obligations is to make sure that everyone has access to certain and equal treatment within an open and dynamic market economy are fundamental European Community objectives; objectives which are furthered by services as social rights that make an important contribution to economic and social cohesion. This is why general interest services are at the heart of the European model of society" (European Commission Communication 1996:1). The objective is to ensure a mutually-beneficial interplay between the requirements of a single market and free competition, free movement, and economic performance and dynamism, on the one hand, and general-interest objectives, on the other. The Commission considers this to be a difficult balancing act since "the goal posts are constantly moving: the single market is continuing to expand and public services, far from fixed, are having to adapt to new requirements" (Commission Communication 1996:3).
As a result of the Intergovernmental Conference for the Amsterdam Treaty, a new Art. 16
(ex 7D) was introduced, which stresses the role of general-economic-interest services in the Community values and the role they play in advancing social cohesion in the European Union.
This article still upholds the primacy of competition rules in principle, but for the first time it explicitly introduces general-economic-interest goals as European values; it thus contrasts with the previous situation, under the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the Single Market
Programme of 1987, when general-interest services were primarily regarded as an obstacle to market integration. How did this change in policy and law-making come about? It will be seen at the empirical cross-sectoral level that the change reflected in the Amsterdam Treaty was achieved after a lengthy political battle in the European arena, spearheaded by France. But first a general explanation of the political dynamics leading to general-interest outcomes in the interaction between European actors will be presented, which will then be applied to utility policies.
Why European policies which promote general-interest services? The political process: General propositions
The outcomes of the European decision-making process are explained on the basis of a reconstruction of the constellations of interest and the strategies employed by formal key actors in the context of a specific, enabling and restricting European institutional setting, that is, an actor-centred institutionalist approach (Mayntz, Scharpf 1995) . The analysis of the European formal decision process is viewed against the background of the national and European political dynamic built up under the impression of domestic socio-political conflicts.
essential services of high quality at prices they can afford" (European Commission Communication 1996:2).
Informal political and social actors are taken into account both in respect to how they pressure the formal political and legal actors to put public-interest issues on the decisionmaking agenda. However, the main explanation focuses on the formal decision-making process and its outcomes.
The two basic institutional conditions for interaction in European decision-making are: a) the decision-making rules that are applied; and b) multi-level and multi-arena government.
a) The decision-making rules that may come to bear in shaping European policy outcomes in the three sectors under study are: firstly, the unanimity rule, evoked, on the one hand, act autonomously is best realised in this area (Schmidt 1998:301) and is most easily expanded in the area of competition policy 4 . 4 However, what makes this tendency less clear cut is that the sector-specific interest represented by another Directorate General (DG) may counteract these endeavours and in fact make it more difficult for the
The European Parliament has a record of favouring policies which foster general-interest services. This is not surprising in view of its function, which is based on the fact that its members represent constituencies of millions of utility customers/voters who depend on the availability of public services in their everyday lives. The Parliament has upheld public services in sectoral legislation on network activities, on electricity, as well as gas, railway and airtransport networks, telecommunications and postal services. It also issued various general statements of its position to that effect in 1994 , 1995 and 1997 (EP Fact Sheets 1.6.1999 . As regards institutional resources, if the co-decision rule is applied in policymaking matters, it has the right to veto proposals on European legislation. The European Court of Justice assumes the role of a latent player in the political game, as it does not directly and explicitly take part in the policy-making process. Its function -at least in theory -is to be impartial to policy preferences, and, instead, to interpret cases which are brought to it in accordance with the principles of the Treaty of Rome, existing legislation and precedent rulings. However, it is a latent player in policy making in so far as it is used as a resource by other players or put in game theoretical terms, actors engage in backwardinduction as to how a court ruling -given precedent rulings-might affect their bargaining position more or less favourably. This in turn influences the path of action chosen by the players. If appealed to in a case, the Court starts to play an explicit role in the policy-making process -although it considers it to be a non-political one. Its institutional resource consists of the power of veto vis-à-vis existing or proposed legislation.
Commission to pursue the goal of liberalisation (Schmidt 1998 ).
Interestingly, in recent years the Court has reconsidered its role with respect to judicial activism in utility policy making. It has emphasised the need for deciding at a general political policy-making level, that is, at the Commission, Council and parliamentary level, and it warns the Commission against making overly-extensive use of single-issue-(infringement)
procedures subject to Court rulings (Schmidt 1998:263 and Hoskins 1995:169) . If the Court continues to view its role in such terms, the possibilities of using it and its legal resources as a coalition partner in the policy-making process will be more restricted. Based on the preferences described above, and against the background of the two contextual institutional aspects, the following propositions are put forward, which -I maintain -account for policy outcomes favourable to public-service goals at the European level.
At the cross-sectoral, decision-making level we observe a double dynamic of multi-level and multi-arena policy making:
-If a member state brings a general interest issue to the supranational sectoral level
-shifts the issue from a more limited (sectoral) to a broader (IGC) arena with a wider scope of decision-making (multi-arena dynamic),
-and seeks an alliance with the EP to advance general interest goals, the chances of realising the general-interest policy goal increase.
At the sectoral level I propose that:
-General-interest goals are more likely to be pursued if the internal market decision route (Art. 95 (ex 100a)) is chosen and the European Parliament takes part in the decisionmaking process under Art. 251 (ex 189b) (co-decision rule).
-If, by contrast, the competition route is chosen under Art. 86.3 (ex 90.3), the realisation of public-interest goals is more likely.
-The Commission uses infringement procedures in order to increase individual member states' willingness to support liberalisation policies at the Council level.
The decision as to which path -i.e., the treaty revision path, the internal market path or the competition path -is chosen, depends both on:
-whether member state governments support an issue to be put onto the IGC agenda, and -whether member-state governments engage in substantive and institutional resistance vis-à-vis the use of Art. 86.3 (ex 90.3) by the Commission.
With respect to the Court, whose legal resources tend to be exploited by all actors it is claimed that -a political actor who can credibly claim the support of the Court by referring to precedents favouring general-interest services is more likely to achieve his or her policy goals.
General propositions in the light of the empirical political process: the cross-sectoral level
In trying to answer the question regarding how general-interest services, as a cross-sectoral objective of European policy making, came to be incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty, the role of France, as the promoter of service-public interests 5 and as a player in the two-level and cross-arena game, is of paramount importance. The public service debate is primarily being conducted in France, Belgium, Spain and Italy, whereas there is no corresponding notion of a "public service" in countries such as Great Britain, Germany or the Netherlands (Schmidt 1998:227) 6 . In brief, in the political decision-making process, the domestic conflict which evolved in France around the issue of social cohesion, in which the public services play a crucial role, spilled over to the European level in the course of the liberalisation process.
In spite of only constituting a strong minority position at this level, France, in coalition with the European Parliament -which had increased its sway under the co-decision rule -, The French notion of "public service" developed as a counterpart to "puissance publique" in French administrative law and at the end of the 19 th century gave rise to an extended debate in the discipline. The advocates of "puissance publique" conceived of the state as a sovereign power dealing with its subordinate subjects by means of command and control and other rules. The adherents of the "public-service school" conceived of administrative action less in terms of super-and sub-ordination. Rather -under the impact of economic liberalism and the beginnings of social benefits bestowed by the state -they viewed the state as delivering services and benefits to citizens. Today public service in France is defined as an activity which is deployed by a public enterprise in the general interest. However, the government can also charge private actors to perform these activities (Le Nestour, Zinow 1994:129/30) . It is strongly influenced by the "esprit de corps" of the engineering schools and their centralist and technocratic views of the utilities (Schmidt 1998:227) . 6 Nonetheless, there are some forms of public-service principles in Great Britain too, such as universal service in telecommunications and non-discrimination within the UK utilities law (Prosser 1994:16) . Even though the Citizens' Charter exercise has its limitations, it can be seen as "the germ of an idea that access to public services is something to which citizens have a legitimate right" (Prosser 1994:17) . In Germany the notion of Daseins vorsorge (Forsthoff 1968 (Scott 1995:211) . A critical stance was also taken by X-Europe Réseaux, the association of the former students of the Polytechnique, a higher education institution, which was concerned about the professional status of the French polytechnicians in the French network services (Bauby, Boual 1997:318) . They created a public-service interest association, "Réseau Service Public", with the aim of systematically tying the future of public services to the construction of Europe as a polity, and re-establishing the legitimacy of the public services vis-à-vis liberal claims. (Bauby, Boual 1997) . The réseau then proceeded to develop a crosssectoral network of support for public services, first at the national level, which included a variety of public and private actors such as politicians and administrators, utility operators, unions, consumer associations and academics. Several conferences were organised where the European challenge to public-interest services was discussed and supporters rallied to defend them (Bauby, Boual 1993 , 1994 . The social movements in favour of more social cohesion in Europe in 1995, and the strikes of the transport workers, which enjoyed considerable popular support, as well as the demonstrations against unemployment, all this increased the pressure of such domestic conflicts and aided the endeavours to influence the European utility policy.
In a second stage these activities were systematically carried over to the European level, targeted at the culprit, as it were. As a result of interministerial consultation, a memorandum was delivered to the Commission asking for a European Charter. The President of the Commission at that time, Jacques Delors, asked the CEEP to submit a draft for such a charter. "Though the Commission has shown some muted enthusiasm for such a Charter, it has fallen to the interest group which represents public enterprises in the member states, the CEEP, to develop its principles" (Scott 1995:211) . At this point links were established with the European Parliament, where a working group, " public service ", was instituted.
Simultaneously, the group Réseaux 2010 at the Commissariat du Plan was established, and the Initiative for Public Services in Europe was launched (Bauby, Boual 1997:321) . In 1994
Réseaux Services organised the first European forum in Brussels which brought together diverse actors concerned with public services. As a result, the "European Liaison Committee on General Interest Services", the secretariat headed by the French "Réseaux Services Publics" mentioned above, was formed. At the Amsterdam conference the Liaison Committee, in co-operation with the European Parliament, now set out to influence the revision of the Treaty in matters of public services by putting together an alliance of diverse European actors in order to counter-balance the competition-oriented logic of the Treaty with general-interest logic. In deploying and master-minding the political strategy, France was circumspect enough not to impose the "French model" of "service public" and "to be too franco-français" (Bauby, Boual 1997:323) , pursuing a two-pronged strategy instead. It simultaneously criticised and called for a reform of its own public services while pressing for a European concept of general-interest services.
The objectives pursued were to be set out in a European Charter establishing public services as fundamental rights under Art. 2 of the Treaty of Rome. General-interest goals were to be incorporated into the Treaty in the context of Union citizenship, consumer protection, the Trans-European Networks, the competitiveness of industry, economic and social cohesion, and environmental protection. Art. 86 (ex 90) was to be revised to ensure that competition and general-interest goals were henceforth treated equally as Community goals (Bauby, Boual 1997:325) . At an institutional level, a systematic evaluation of the performance of public services was to be introduced, subjecting operators and regulators to the scrutiny of an independent Office of Evaluation. This would apply evaluation criteria in a "pluralist confrontation" of different actors, made possible by its specific composition of regulators, operators, different types of consumers, personnel, unions and representatives of civil society.
Only in this way -so the argument went -could the notorious asymmetry of information between regulators and private regulatees be overcome (Bauby, Boual 1997:325) .
A first success was achieved in 1996 when the European Parliament voted in favour of a resolution that the European Community should not only be oriented towards the creation of a single market but also towards the pursuit of general-interest goals, to be included in Art. This was supported by Italy and Spain, which stressed the link between public service and employment. Great Britain clearly opposed this and pressed for more far-reaching deregulation at domestic and European levels. Finally, there were the countries which pursued 7
It also explicitly stresses that the organisational form for providing these services may vary: the services can be organised in a legal monopoly or in a competitive situation by private companies, by public bodies or public-private partnerships.
a divided strategy, namely Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany. They would not come out clearly against or in favour of deregulation in the Council of Ministers. Instead, they hoped to shift the problem of public services and their necessary reform from the domestic to the European level, making Europe a scapegoat, as it were. At home they were reluctant to take an explicit pro-deregulation stance (Dury 1996:22 ), playing a two-level game, attempting to avoid domestic political costs by shifting the blame to Europe.
A majority in the European Parliament was in favour of incorporating principles of general-interest services into the Treaty. The European Socialist Group in particular pressed for these principles and for the introduction of a Citizens' Charter. The European People's Party sought to widen general-economic-interest services by adding universal services and guaranteeing the quality of certain services (Dury 1996:23 Parliament a role in decision-making has resulted in political actors becoming more widely involved in the decision-making process on utilities, which has brought about a "gradual cultural change under which utilities law and policy is increasingly seen as a political rather than a technical area, and therefore an area in which political debate is possible (Judge et. al. 1994 )" (Scott 1995:211) . As an outcome of the decision-making process of the Intergovernmental Conference, a new Article 16 (ex 7d) was enacted in the Treaty of Thus France, pressed by internal domestic conflicts, successfully played a two-level and two-arena game, shifting the debate around general-interest services first from the national to the European level, and there in the official decision-making process from the sectoralCouncil arena to the cross-sectoral Intergovernmental Conference arena. As a result, the general-interest-services debate gained force and salience at the cross-sectoral level.
However, a new orientation towards social regulation and general-interest services occurred not only at the cross-sectoral but also at the sectoral level.
Sectors

Telecommunications
Extensive technological and economic changes had been transforming telecommunications.
International competition and technological modernisation called into question both the existing public monopolies and the coalitions which supported the existing regulatory institutional arrangement (Thatcher 1999:3) . In Europe, Britain was the first to change its regulations, while in many other European countries, such as France and Germany, the old institutional structures persisted. Following a Green Paper in 1987, a number of European regulatory measures (notably in the form of Directives) were issued on competition issues, prohibiting member states from maintaining legal monopolies over supply in the market segments of terminals, advanced services, satellites and mobile communications. In the mid1990s European legislation also targeted the monopolies at the core of the sector -voice telephony and the building and operation of telecommunications networks -until, by 1998, it had extended across the entire sector (Thatcher 1999:4) . The second set of provisions introduced re-regulation, specifying the conditions of supply. They are to secure fair and effective competition as well as universal service, together with the mechanisms that member states could use to fund universal service obligations (Thatcher 1999:4) .
Viewing the empirical process of liberalisation and re-regulation as analysed in the literature (Schmidt 1998; Thatcher 1999 ) in light of my sectoral hypotheses regarding generalinterest services, it appears that the Commission has indeed used the competition route to a considerable extent to advance the process of liberalisation and has been supported by the Court in these endeavours. The Commission used Art. 86.3 (ex 90.3) to issue directives to all member states, and it thereby avoided the need for formal Council approval in order to realise its goal of introducing competition. However, each of these directives has subsequently been challenged before the Court by one or more member states (Schmidt 1998; Scott 1995) , particularly on institutional grounds, since member-state governments have objected to the use of Commission directives which by-pass the Council, while in principle they have supported the substance of the directive. The Court, in its turn, upheld the Commission's view that, under Article 90.3, it had a right to make rules in the form of directives to clarify the obligations of the member states (Scott 1995:209) .
In her empirical analysis of the process, Susanne Schmidt emphasised that in order for the Commission to be able to use Art. 86.3 (ex 90.3) it had to prepare the ground thoroughly in advance. By publishing its Green Paper, it was able to mobilise support in a sector characterised by rapid change and uncertainty. Among member states, Britain was most supportive because it wanted to prevent the other countries from maintaining their monopolies (Thatcher 1999:5 
Energy
Like other network utilities, electricity typically has long-term, specific assets which require a high start-up investment, an integrated network (the grid) and high co-ordination requirements (Eberlein 1999; Schmidt 1998) . It is also characterised by fluctuating demand and the fact that it cannot be stored, which make it difficult to offer a continuous sufficient capacity. Nor can a substitute be found which increases the supply security problems. For these reasons the sector has traditionally been regarded as a natural monopoly, which is best organised as a vertically-integrated system controlled by the government and not subject to competition. In the course of world-wide liberalisation in the 1980s and 90s, however, the sector underwent a radical transformation (Eberlein 1999:14; Schmidt 1998; Eising 2000) . The objective was to increase efficiency and to reduce costs by separating the operation of the infrastructure, i.e., the installation and management of transmission and distribution networks in the generation and supply of electricity.
In Europe the agenda of market reforms faced a heterogeneous landscape of national electricity-management systems (McGowan 1996; Matlary 1996) . Basically there were two different types of national electricity systems: vertically-integrated national monopolies such as existed in Britain and France, on the one hand, and decentralised fragmented systems such as in Germany, on the other with its complex system of public and private ownership on different territorial levels as regional monopolies (Eberlein 1999:15; Schmidt 1998:185) .
The variety of national backgrounds and the diversity of policy goals resulting from them posed many hurdles, which the European decision-making process had to overcome in its attempts to institute a Common Energy Policy, starting in 1988 with the Commission's report on the "Internal Market for Energy" (Commission 1988). The first attempt at liberalisation provoked considerable opposition from both sectoral and governmental actors (Schmidt 1998; Eising 2000) . Anticipating further massive opposition, the Commission decided not to act under Art. 86.3 (90.3), but to choose instead the market-integration avenue when it proposed its first draft directive in 1992. The entire time that the Commission was pursuing this decision route, it was also threatening to bring import and export monopolies before the Court of Justice (Schmidt 1998; Eising 2000) . The draft directive met with stiff opposition in the Council and the Parliament, the latter adopting a resolution in favour of public services in electricity and gas in 1993 (EP Fact Sheet 1.6.1999, p.4). In particular, the provision on thirdparty access in the 1992 draft raised concerns with respect to general-interest perspectives.
The proposed "common-carrier" principle and the issue of third-party access to the network were interpreted as risks for existing and planned investments in the network, impinging upon the safety of supply. The abolition of closed-supply areas was seen as jeopardising the longterm provision of the population, and it was thought that it would lead to considerable price increases for small customers, as captive clients, because the large users would be taken out of the integrated calculations (Schmidt 1998:221) In this situation the French government proposed the single-buyer model, which offered the best possibility for maintaining the existing practice (Schmidt 1998; Eising 2000) .
Germany was also opposed to the Commission proposals. However, having closely observed Britain's energy reform, building on expertise provided by an independent Commission, as well as being encouraged by the liberalisation policy of the Federal Cartel
Office, the Ministry of Economics gradually changed its view and proposed the liberalisation of the energy sector. This met with a very mixed political response in the domestic arena (Schmidt 1998) . The local utilities and their associations opposed liberalisation, while the regional and large utilities opted for the introduction of competition. It was the municipal firms that voiced particular concern over public interests because -according to the argument -the prices for captive consumers would rise; this political concern was taken up by some ministries and the Social-Democratic/Green majority in the Federal Council. By supporting 8
In addition to the licensing procedure for establishing new generation and transmission capacity, the Commission provided for a process of public tendering -merely separate accounting for the vertically integrated companies, instead of an organizational separation of management and operation -and the possibility of negotiated access for third parties (Schmidt 1998:233) . The latter saw this as an opportunity to undermine the municipalities' control over local supply areas, a reform which could never be realized solely by domestic political means.
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In the 80s France had pressed for European liberalization in order to be able to export its surplus electricity. When it realized the full-blown implications of such a step, i.e., the need to subject itself to European competition policy and the consequences that would imply for the domestic monopoly position of EDF, it restricted itself to calling for the closer co-operation between the utilities providers. However, in view of the on-going liberalisation pressure, it could not retreat entirely from its earlier position. In some government quarters (the Finance Ministry), though, the European liberalisation policy was also viewed as an opportunity the negotiated third-party access model, based on associative self-regulation, the government circumvented the Federal Council. Since the French and German governments had decided not to let each other be outvoted on the issue of electricity liberalisation, their opposing views made agreement in the Council difficult (Schmidt 1998) . However, once they had struck a deal, each under the respective pressure described above, a compromise providing for a complicated market-opening formula was found (Schmidt 1998:250; Eising 2000) and was passed unanimously in the Council in 1996.
By mandating third-party access to the electricity networks and by ending the monopoly rights for the construction of power lines and power stations, Community directive 96/92/EC stipulates that markets be incrementally and moderately opened to competition. It requires member states to ensure that the management (and distribution) of their transmission system is unbundled, in order to prevent discrimination against new competitors. However, member states are free to choose between different forms of unbundling. In some countries a separate legal entity has been created to manage the network and grant access rights, while in other national systems the transmission system operators are only entities which are independent in terms of management and accounting from the generation and supply segments within a single electricity company (Eberlein 1999:18) . As far as third-party access is concerned, there are three modes of achieving non-discriminatory access to electricity: regulated-party access, Art. 3 of the directive also includes a public-service clause that allows the imposition of public-interest obligations on energy companies. This makes it possible for liberalisation to be suspended if it prevents compliance with these tasks. To safeguard the security of supply, as well as its regularity and quality at affordable prices, member states can individually define public-service obligations in the general economic interest, provided that they are objective, transparent and non-discriminatory (Eberlein 1999:20) .
Because the directive constituted only a modest step towards liberalisation, the Commission has continued to apply the infringement procedures against the import and to challenge the EDF's position (Schmidt 1998 (Schmidt 1998:263) . These rulings starkly contrast with the Court's behaviour in the 80s and early 90s, when it supported the Commission in its application of Art. 86.3 (ex 90.3) , which led to the marginalization of the "peau de chagrin", the concept of public service (Belloubet-Frier 1994:274) . The ECJ also redefined its own scope of action and its willingness to be used as a political resource to be exploited by the Commission's liberalisation objectives. It emphasised -particularly in its ruling of 1997 (Almelo) but even earlier -that where no Community policy existed, the Commission should refrain from singling out and attacking individual aspects of a regulatory area. Instead, it invited the Commission to devise an overall solution or to wait for the Council to act accordingly (Edward, Hoskins 1995) .
In light of my propositions, we can conclude from the story of electricity liberalisation (Schmidt 1998; Scott 1995; Eising 2000) and its implications for general-interest services that the Commission would indeed have preferred to use Art. 86.3 (ex 90.3), but that it failed to do so because member states opposed this attempt. Member states brought their opposition to bear by exerting influence on Commissioners -despite the formal independence of the latter -whenever crucial member-state interests were at stake (Schmidt 1998:316) . What emerges, moreover, is that the structure of the market made it difficult for the Commission to break this resistance by finding alliance partners to launch a liberalisation procedure. It was faced both with a de facto providers' cartel, organised in the European association of UCTPE, and with the fact that large users were bought off by being offered special rates (Schmidt 1998:317) . Hence the Commission had to use the market-integration avenue, which had an impact on policy outcomes: the Parliament, which was an important opponent to liberalisation, had to be included; the Commission was thus forced to substantially alter its reform plans in favour of general-interest services (Schmidt 1998:224/225 ). Existing empirical analyses also show that the individual competition instrument (infringement procedure) was skilfully used to promote the willingness of individual member states to support a common policy: faced with the threat of a special infringement procedure against import and export monopolies, the French proposed "their liberalisation model", the singlebuyer model. However -as Susanne Schmidt points out -the Commission had to maintain a delicate balance in its use, on the one hand between the individual-infringement procedures as a lever to create interest in a council policy decision, and on the other the need not to disturb negotiations by using individual procedures once they were under way (Schmidt 1998) 11 . 11 "Sobald die Ratsverhandlungen initiiert waren, hätten parallele wettbewerbsrechtliche Entscheidungen als einseitige Einflußnahme der Kommission gegolten, mit der sie Verhandlungsergebnisse präjudizierte. Mit
The Court played an important role in favouring general-interest goals in the policy-making process by ruling as it did in the cases of Corbeau and Almelo and is indicating an increasing unwillingness to be the ally of the Commission in pushing liberalisation issues.
3 Transport (Rail)
One reason for the development of a common railway policy (Kerwer and Teutsch 2001) - beyond the general market integration philosophy -was the crisis prevailing in the rail sector.
Railways have continuously been losing out in intermodal competition between rail, road haulage and air transport. The aim of the early Community railway policy was to reduce the disadvantages in intermodal competition resulting from state intervention. In a programme to relaunch the railways as a means of transport, a growth strategy was deployed with the Commission new intent on assuming a much more activist role in this process. The core idea has always been to introduce intra-modal competition and technical interoperability and to increase the environmental sustainability of transport, while at the same time investing in a system of high-speed trains at the European level (Kerwer and Teutsch 2001) .
The Common Railway Policy of the beginning of the 90s was decided upon relatively quickly, in less than two years. This is all the more surprising in view of the factual decisionmaking process, for although it is possible to use the Qualified Majority Rule under the terms of the Single European Act, in the Transport Council the principle of unanimity is still in force whenever a member state sees unfavourable consequences for regional development and the operation of their transport systems. The pressure to find a consensus is thus particularly great in transport policy making. As mentioned, the Commission, supported by the Court and the Parliament, which emphasised the importance of railway networks in its resolution of 1990, promoted the creation of a single market in transport, while the Council in its majority resisted these policy initiatives. With respect to member state governments, two coalitions could be distinguished: on the one hand, Britain and the Netherlands were unconditional supporters of liberalisation; on the other, there were conditional supporters of a railway liberalisation who saw problems of technical compatibility and operational security. France was the most sceptical and sought to slow down liberalisation as much as possible
12
. It supported the idea of greater co-operation between different (national) railway enterprises. In ihrer Rolle als unabhängiger Agendagestalter war dies nicht zu vereinbaren" (Schmidt 1998:321) . 12 At closer scrutiny, though, it emerges that it played a multi-level game with divided roles: while officials in the Ministry of Economics sought to advance the domestic process of liberalisation by co-operating with the Commission, politicians -influenced by the strikes and social movements -articulated their support for spite of the opposition, the reform of 1991 was passed in a relatively short time firstly because the political impetus of the Single Market Programme was skilfully used by the pro-liberalizers.
Secondly, instead of emphasising that railways were a part of the infrastructure, as had been done previously, the programme for relaunching the railways as a growth industry changed decision-makers' way of thinking about railways; and the general sense of crisis regarding the railways increased the willingness to experiment with reforms. Thirdly, the directive did not entail precise and demanding prescriptions, but rather modest requirements (Kerwer and Teutsch 2001) . The new regulatory principles adopted entail the abolition of government intervention in railway management and replacing it with private-enterprise objectives.
Railways are no longer exempt from rules on state subsidy. Any state aid granted has to obtain authorisation from the Commission. However, this does not apply to compensation for public-service obligations or for exceptional social costs (such as pension funds).
Infrastructure management and service operation have to be separated at the level of accounting (as opposed to the organisational and -more demandingly -the institutional level). The mandatory liberalisation of market access is only related to international undertakings and combined transport. 
EP ECJ
The most recent European drafts on rail regulations of 1999/2000 seek to enhance competition while at the same time allowing for the pursuit of general-interest goals: The amended "licensing directive" (1995/18EC) wants to ensure the fair, transparent and nondiscriminatory treatment of all railway undertakings in the licensing process. The issuing of licensing shall be carried out by a body which does not provide rail transport services itself. As regards general-interest services, the directive also provides that a railway undertaking shall general-interest services (Douillet and Lehmkuhl 2001) .
comply with national law and regulatory provisions related to technical regulation requirements, to health and safety as well as to the protection of consumers' benefits (Official Journal of the European Communities, p. C178/23). The new "infrastructure capacity directive" wants to ensure that the allocation of charges for capacity and railway infrastructure follow competitive principles. It also provides for member states to establish a regulatory body independent of the infrastructural undertakings. In the decision-making process the EP, while emphatically supporting rail network liberalisation (FAZ 15.8.2000) , called for more investment in infrastructure and transport technology in order to make up for lost ground vis à vis road transport. In the legislative resolution on the Council's common position on the second directive, the EP's Committee on Regions, Transport and Tourism voted to add a paragraph in favour of public-benefit transport systems. Member states should be allowed to take the necessary measures to ensure that priority is given to public-benefit transport services by providing "the railway operators with compensation for financial losses arising from the fact that a certain rail capacity must be allocated in the interests of public transport service" (Art. 14, paragraph 1a) 13 .
In the light of our general claims, this decision-making process in rail-liberalisation and its outcomes show, firstly, that attributing exclusively pro-competition preferences to the Commission is in part wrong, since the Commission has not only promoted liberalisation, but has also supported an investment programme to relaunch the railways. Further it shows that the European Parliament has been supportive of efforts to incorporate public-service interests, and as in the cross-sectoral arena, France has been particularly active in forging an alliance with the EP in order to promote general-interest services in the course of liberalisation. However, it also shows that the EP is a supporter of liberalisation in the rail sector in order to strengthen rail transport vis à vis the other modes of transport.
Conclusion
I started out with the question: Why is it that -contrary to the claim about the in-built bias of European policies in favour of competition -empirically we are faced with decision-making outcomes in the utilities which are enhancing public interest goals? The prevalence of competition and market integration goals has been traced to the low consensus costs linked to decision-making in competition policy. The Commission can initiate infringement procedures which may or may not be supported by the ECJ. The Commission can also issue directives to force special undertakings to comply with rules of competition without passing through the Council and the EP. So, indeed, using these avenues of decision making involves lower decision-making costs, and it would be completely rational if the Commission would primarily use these avenues when initiating policy in the utilities. How can countervailing empirical tendencies, then, be accounted for? It is claimed and shown that -since the Commission is not the sole policy initiator -such measures may be launched by individual member states that, in view of domestic pressure, play a multi-level and multi-arena game. They not only bring the issue of concern (for a minority) to the European level, they also shift it from the sectoral to the intergovernmental arena in order to increase their leverage in influencing decision-making. This process can be empirically observed in the case of cross-sectoral policymaking in favour of public services that was initiated by France and resulted in the insertion of general economic interest goals into the Amsterdam Treaty. The process was facilitated by forming an alliance with the EP, an actor pre-dominantly favouring general interest goals.
Having the EP as a coalition partner proves to be beneficial to advancing general interest services in individual sectors as well. Hence choosing a decision-making avenue that gives the EP an important role clearly increases the chances of bringing such a decision about. This is borne out by the evidence in all three sectors, even in telecommunications, where the competition decision-making route -under Art 86.3 (ex 90.3) -was the predominant avenue in the 90s, when it was frequently used to bring liberalisation about and -in spite of the opposition of member states on institutional grounds -was confirmed by the ECJ.
Simultaneously, the Commission skilfully used individual infringement procedures to increase the willingness of individual member states to politically support a European liberalisation process at the Council level. For once a country was forced to liberalise, it developed a general interest that the other member states follow suit.
The use of the competition decision-making avenue by the Commission proved to be much more difficult in the area of energy liberalisation. Here-in contrast to telecommunications -member-states mustered up institutional and substantive opposition to the Commission's use of Art 86.3 (ex 90.3). Individual infringement procedures could not be easily utilised to break-up the anti-liberalisation front of member states. The EC's rulings played an important role in this context. They expressed a less stringent view on public monopolies, and they sent a signal to the Commission to use the route of political decisionmaking. Hence the market-integration avenue was used, implicating the Council and the EP. This made the decision process slow and cumbersome and its outcome diverse. Different institutional solutions were allowed for, and general interest services were incorporated.
The development in the rail sector also calls into question the proposition that there is an inherent bias due to the prevalence of the competition route, but it does so from a different angle. Here the Commission's preferences are not uniquely in favour of liberalisation in the first place, but show a double orientation: they are at the same time oriented towards largescale investment projects in the railways to strengthen their position in intermodal competition. Simultaneously, the preferences of the EP are not uniquely in favour of generalinterest goals either; they are also pro-liberalisation. This is due to the fact that the support of the railways as such (as opposed to road and air traffic) is considered to be general-interest oriented because of being an environmentally-friendly decision. In rail the Commission did not use the competition route in decision-making. One reason may be that the technical feasibility of market integration is more difficult to achieve here than in energy and telecommunications. Large-scale investment projects in the railways also required positive decisions in the Council. Due to the deep institutionalisation of the national railway systems and the high consensus needs of the decision path chosen, the European decision-making outcome left a lot of leeway for discretion at the national level, including the possibility to continue pursuing public-interest goals in the liberalised railways.
In conclusion then, the case of policy making in favour of general-interest goals at a crosssectoral level and in individual utilities shows that there is indeed a strong tendency in European policy making in favour of competition and market integration. This is because, when the competition route is chosen, the costs needed for consensus building are saved.
However, there are several mechanisms and factors that work against this tendency, serving to break its force to some extent: the dynamism of cross-arena policy making that may increase the lever for bargaining, even for minority positions; the increasingly important role the European Parliament plays in defending the interests of its constituents; the resistance of member states to the Commission's use of the competition route under Art. 86.3 (ex 90.3); the fact that, from the outset, the Commission may not always have pro-competition preferences, but market-correcting ones instead; and finally, the time dimension, which points to the fact that liberalisation occurs in stages, that there is an initial phase of market creation, and that the abolishment of monopolies is followed by a stage of re-regulation in which the need to correct the negative effects of liberalisation is perceived.
